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This paper proposes a specific approach to understanding the nature of tech¬
nology that encompasses the entire field of technological praxis, from the
making of primitive tools to using the Internet. In that approach, technology
is a specific form of human agency that yields to (an imperfect) realization of
human control over a technological situation that is, a situation not gov¬
erned to an end by natural constraints but by specific human aims.The com¬
ponents of such technological situations are a given collection of natural or
artificial beings, humans, human aims, and situation-bound tools. By per¬
forming technological situation analysis, the essential form of tool making,
the complex system of relationships between science and technology, techno¬
logical practices with and without machines, the finiteness or imperfectness
of any technology, and engineering (i.e., the possibility of the creation of
technological situations) can be considered. For a better characterization of
the approach to technology, the paper also presents a comparison of other
philosophies of technology. Following Feenberg’s comparative analysis, the
so-called fundamental question of the philosophy of technology is formulat¬
ed, its two sides are identified, and it is applied for clarification of our position
within philosophy of technology. In our approach, all human praxis can be
considered to be technological; more precisely, every human activity has a
technological aspect or dimension.
3.1 Introduction
As to meet the objective of this paper, a rather special concept of technolo¬
gy is needed. In particular, the concept of technology must be broad
enough to include technology in all its historical forms, primitive tool¬
making as well as recent information technologies. No doubt this is an
sentialist” view on technology since only an essentialist view is capable of
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accounting for the features that protean historical forms of technology have
in common, and hence identifying the point in time when technology was
born. However, instead of following in Heidegger's or Ellul’s footsteps, I
propose a different philosophy of technology based on a more universal
concept of technology [183, 186, 184, 185].
I propose that the essence of technology is a specific form or aspect of hu¬
man agency, the realization of the human control over a technological situa¬
tion. In consequence of the deployment of this human agency, the course and
the outcome of the situation are no longer governed by natural constraints
but by specific human goals. The human control of technological situations
yields artificial beings as outcomes.What is a technological situation?Techno¬
logical situations are situations with a specific character. More concretely,
technological situations vary and they are not homogeneous in nature, so,
they can be identified on the basis of their constituents.The components that
make up a technological situation are:




In Hegel’s words, the essence of technology necessarily appears in concrete,
particular technologies only, while on the other hand, all technologies neces¬
sarily embody the essence of technology. According to this view, every element
of the human world is created by technologies. Even human nature and social
being are the products of our technological activity, and their characteristics are
determined by the specificities of the technologieswe use to produce them.
In comparison with widely accepted views on technology, this view implies
an extremely general and abstract conceptualization of technological praxis.
In particular, all human praxis appears as technological, or better said, as
having a technological aspect or dimension. The view on technology pro¬
posed above is therefore really close to a philosophy or theory of human prac¬
tice. Human practice includes the imperfect realization of human control
over a situation. Human practice is of course not identical with technological
praxis, as the former has several other aspects as well, but it always and nec¬
essarily has a technological aspect too. Moreover, every human situation can
be regarded as a technological situation, every human being as a technologi¬
cal agent, every human goal as accomplishable by a specific technology, and
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every human tool as a situation-bound technological tool. The technological
aspect of human practice is a response to human vulnerability and expresses
the intention to gain control over the situations of our lives.Without such
an evidently partial—success we would cease to be human beings; we
would take part in natural situations as natural animal beings. For this
reason, every technology is a technology of humanity: human beings, the
human world, cultures and societies are all products of technologies. Further,
technology is the onlyway humans can create themselves.
Human beings were born together with technologies- and technologywas
born together with human beings. Various branches of technology can be
associated with various types of life situations. Our self-creating praxis is
facilitated by a range of economic, legal, psychic, social, cultural, material,
mechanical, etc. technologies.
In this view, engineering is a meta-technological activity, a specific practice
of handling the components of technological situations, which aims to set up
controllable situations in a given, complex, infinitely extending environment.
3.2Philosophies of technology
For a better characterization of this approach to technology, a comparison
of other philosophies of technology is needed. Of course, we cannot give a
comprehensive overview of the philosophy of technology here;we are satis¬
fied by recalling the approaches and problem areas which are closely con¬
nected to the general nature of technology. There are numerous books,
journals and electronic sources of information for a more comprehensive
review of the philosophy of technology.1
Most philosophers of technology agree with the claim according to which
technology is a human product. People, following certain (according to
different philosophers, different) aims operate technologies in order to
satisfy basic human needs. According to the traditional view about humans
and technology, technology is a complex tool and an act which make the
forces of nature serve humans. As a result of technological activities, we
intentionally transform the physical world to make it function according to
our aims and to achieve a certain result. This means that we practically
have a human or social control over technologies including their construc¬
tion, use and developments. However, it is possible to conceive the work
and even the emergence and change of technologies as autonomous pro¬
cesses of which are eventually not controlled or even not necessarily con-
1See e.g. [148, 149, 192, 42, 93, 95, 128, 47, 49, 160, 178]
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trollable by particular human or social agents. All philosophies of technolo¬
gy include one of these (autonomous or controlled technology) positions.
All philosophies of technology take also a stand on the question of whether
technology is value-neutral or value-laden. In other words, are the goals and
means which are necessarily a part of technological activities separable from
each other? If we assume their separability, given technological tools can
successfully contribute to the realization of the most varied aims, that is, the
tools themselves do not follow any goals, therefore in a certain sense they are
neutral. Obviously, we can reach the same conclusion if we note that a given
goal can be realized with different types of tools. In contrast, if we assume that
tools have their own values, these are unavoidably built into the value system
of the aim, since they will influence the goal that can be realized. That is,
technology cannot be regarded as value-neutral but it is and we
have to take its value content into accountwhile using it.
Adopting Feenberg’s chart [47, 50], a classification of the most significant ver¬
sions of philosophies of technology based on the above-mentioned relations
can be presented. Fourmain groups of classical philosophies of technology are
differentiable: determinist, instrumentalist, substantivist, and critical versions.
See in theTable (the table also contains some illustrative examples):













The main characteristics of the philosophies of technology classified above can
be identified on the basis of what we said earlier, but perhaps the choice of the
names and the typicalversions of the classesmight require some explanation.
The deterministviewhas high hopes about the autonomous development of
technology insofar as it regards technology as the key moving force of social
progress. Technological progress is crucial in creating social progress, but the
direction and the characteristics of social development are not determined by
the values hidden in technology (since technology is value neutral), but by the
goals chosen by people. A view such as this is in complete agreement with
many versions of the modernist value system, for example, the modernist
idea of clockwork or the traditional views ofMarxism.
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The instrumentalist view completely eliminates the connections between
(technological) tools and (human) goals, for example, the idea that technolog¬
ical development necessarily generates social progress, and it interprets tech¬
nological tools asmeanswhich can be freely utilized byman.The philosophi¬
cal assumptions of instrumentalism are usually based on the ideas of liberal¬
ism or pragmatism [160],
Substantivism agrees with determinism in that humans are not the ruler of
technology but rather is at the mercy of technological progress; what is more,
according to this approach this is true in a very important sense. Technology
is not neutral; it unavoidably expresses its own values during its usage, that is,
technology necessarily modifies the goal to be reached and even modifies
man himself. In this way, through enforcing the contents in themselves, tech¬
nological tools shape the life of modern society as a determining factor (think
of for example the effects of cars or television). Substantivist philosophy of
technology (we could also say or based” as
well) usually notes the negative social effects of technological progress and it
often predicts anti-utopist scenarios. The emblematic figures of substan¬
tivism are Jacques Ellul [42] and the famous philosopher of the 20th century,
Martin Heidegger. Heidegger’s late writings are especially significant (written
in the 50s and 60s) [82, 83, 96],
The characteristic figures of critical philosophy of technology (Mumford,
Marcuse, Foucault, and Feenberg) developed their point of view under the
influence of Heidegger and the Frankfurt School [47, 49, 51], They accept the
fact of the connection between the value content of technological tools and
social aims. At the same time, they emphasize the possibility of human con¬
trol over this interconnected conglomerate. In other words, though the tech¬
nological and the human spheres are inseparably interconnected and this has
numerous dangers, the unfolding processes can theoretically be handled
through adequate political, economical or culturalmeans.
However, the question of the autonomy of technology is closely connected
to the question of the value-neutral or value-laden nature of technology - in
fact, they are different sides of the same relationship between technology and
society.While during the interpretation of technologywe paid attention to the
circumstances which connect and separate technology and society, in con¬
nection with the value contents we examine a certain identity of technology
and society and the possibilities of their appearance in each other. Obviously,
both aspects have to be revealed for a successful description of the relation¬
ship between technology and society: their differences and their identity
characterize their relationship appropriately together.The existence of such a
fundamental question demands that every philosophy of technology has to
declare its position in the relationship between technology and society. On
Substantivism
Anti-utopist views




the one hand, it is necessary to choose between the autonomous or non-
autonomous (i.e., human-controlled) existence of technology; on the other, it
is necessaiy to be for or against the value-laden nature of technology.
We can also express this by saying that the fundamental question of the phi¬
losophy of technology is the technology-society relationship, and it has two
sides, namely the standpoints regarding the autonomy of technology and the
value content of technology, which must both be found in any consistently
constructed philosophy of technology-as itwas demonstrated above.
3.3Technology-society relation and human praxis
Let’s consider the fundamental question of technology. First of all: how can
we answer the fundamental question in our approach to technology?
1) Human conditions as technological product. As it is well known, Aristotle
made a sharp distinction between natural and artificial beings (especially in
his Physics). As he declared natural beings (they exist by nature) include in
themselves the principles of motion and rest, but the artificial beings or arti¬
facts (they exist from other causes) are products of the art of making things
[87]. Based on this Aristotelian distinction the fundamental role of technolo¬
gies - by definition as creators of the artificial spheres of beings- in the hu¬
manworld is really crucial.
Since human nature and social beings are artificial ones, technology is the on¬
ly source of their emergence and existence. Every element of the humanworld is
created by technologies. Both human nature and the social being are the prod¬
ucts of our technological activity, and their characteristics are determined by the
specificities of the technology we use to produce them. All historical forms of
human nature and of social being are constructed (and continuously re¬
constructed) or produced (and continuously re-produced) byhistorical versions
of technology. But technology has an ontological Janus face: it produces both
"things” and For thousands of years, have people usedmate¬
rial (agricultural or industrial) technologies where the material product was in
the foreground, although the symbolic contentwas also present.
The last few decades have witnessed a significant technological change, in
that have become dominant over the products in
the most important technologies of our age. On the one hand, new (cognitive,
communication, cultural, and information) technologies have emerged; on the
other hand, the representational or symbolic function of traditional technolo¬
gies has become more significant.As a consequence, the most important char¬
acteristics of the social being are essentially transformed. The terms
industrial / knowledge / risk / information / network society” all refer to a type
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of society where representational technologies are the dominant factor in the
(re)construction or the (re)production of human nature and of social being.
So, the technology as a specific form or aspect of human agency, as the real¬
ization of the human control over a technological situation is the fundamental
creator of the human conditions.
2) Technology as social product.As it is well known social (or human) beings,
obviously, can have an active, crucial role in the formation and functioning of
any technology: given technological and social relations coexist and interre¬
late to each other in a complexway and the technological products and even
the technology itself is a social product. There is no room to present any de¬
tails here, in this way we just remind of the development of numerous ver¬
sions of constructivist ideas on (science and) technology in the sociology of
scientific knowledge (Mannheim, Bloor, Collins), in the social constructivism
(Shapin and Schaffer), in the actor-network theory (Latour), in the phenome¬
nological constructivism [7], in the radical constructivism [57], and so on.
However, there can be found several interesting details in these disciplines on
the social construction of technologies, but the most comprehensive and
convincing view is the idea of the so-called social construction of technology
(SCOT) proposed by Bijker and Pinch [155, 8] in which detailed descriptions
and analyses are proposed on the constructive agents and mechanisms with
several well-documented illustrations.
The SCOT emphasizes the crucial contributions of social actors to the for¬
mation of technologies, and the hermeneutics of science and technology
(Ihde, Borgmann, Heelan) underline and disclose the human aspects of the
constructive processes.
It is an essential aspect of the constructivist views, that engineering, obvi¬
ously has a crucial- but in the different theories different- role in the process
of construction. However, engineering in its traditional sense is not the only
one actor of the construction. For example, in SCOT the of the
features of an artifact happens in the course of a kind of discourse between
engineers and different relevant social groups. In other words in this context
there is a meaning to identify different kinds of or the engi¬
neering has a heterogeneous character [107]. So, technologies are constructed
by social (human) agents in a complex process of mutual actions.
3) Technology-society interrelationships. However, if the human conditions
are technological products, and at the same time technologies are social (hu¬
man) products, how can we avoid circular reasoning in the description of
their causal relationships?
Let’s take into account the fact, that this is not a really specificmethodological
dilemma, but the well-known difficulty of the understanding of complex sys-
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terns, or the nature of complexity at all. Frankly, this difficulty can be considered
as a (not irrelevant at all) definition of complexity, e.g. a complex system is a
collection of a high number of interacting components with mutual determina¬
tions which can be explained with circular causality (see e.g. [45]). In other
words, due to the appearance of circularity in the causal order, the technology-
society conglomeration should have to be considered as a complex system.
However, it is very important that in the history of philosophy there have been
emerged a very effective description of complexity: dialectics. Of course, the
dialectical thinking, or dialectics as a methodology of thinking about complex
beings, has been constructed in different versions with different efficiency. He¬
gel’s dialectics in his Science of Logic can be considered as a genuine under¬
standing of the world as totality - which is another name in philosophy for
complexity. In our recent dilemma, a specific of the Hegelian dia¬
lectical thinking will be used, which was performed byMarx in an unpublished
manuscript thinking about the relationships between production and con¬
sumption [116]. In the chapter called General Relations of Production to
Distribution, Exchange and Consumption" Marx clearly argues that die two
crucial concepts, production and consumption stand in a very complex interre¬
lationship. Here we have no possibility to reproduce the whole argumentation,
but a kind of illustration of his dialectical thinking seems to be useful:
is thus at the same time consumption, and consumption is
at the same time production. Each is simultaneously its opposite. But an
intermediary movement takes place between the two at the same time
Each appears as a means of the other, as being induced by it; this is
called theirmutual dependence; they are thus brought into mutual rela¬
tion and appear to be indispensable to each other, but nevertheless re¬
main extrinsic to each other. Production is not only simultaneously con¬
sumption, and consumption simultaneously production; nor is produc¬
tion only a means of consumption and consumption the purpose of pro¬
duction but each of them by being carried through creates the other, it
creates itself as the other.”
Marx additionally emphasizes that it would be necessary to avoid a kind of
Hegelianism" and based on these statements wrongly declaring
that production and consumption are identical. The circular causation
should be not the final statement. He continued the conceptual analysis
involving additional relationships to seek out the more fundamental or the
predominating factor of the production-consumption conglomeration in
order to reach a real understanding of this complex being.According to our
views, such kind of methodology can be successfully applied for a better
understanding of any kind of complexity.
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In this way, it seems to be possible to adopt this Marxian methodology in
the case of a technology-society complex. Based on the above-mentioned
relationships a kind of circular causation was disclosed in the technology-
society complex. However, it seems to be necessary to go further and to find
a really fundamental, predominant component in the complex. In our view,
these are the human beings. As the first principle, the following is pro¬
posed: technologies are human technologies, societies are human societies.
In other words: the active, acting human beings are situated in the center of
the technology-society complex. The origins of this complex can be found
at the human praxis.
So, to answer the fundamental question of the philosophy of technology
we would propose not to use the separated concepts of autonomy and con¬
trol, but instead of them the more sophisticated concept of technology-
society complex seems to be relevant.
4) Human praxis.Human praxis (or practice) can be found at the origin of
the technology-society complex. This means that all human praxis can be
considered to be technological; more precisely, every human activity has a
technological aspect or dimension. Human practice is not identical with
technological praxis; it evidently has many another aspects, but every prac¬
tice has a technological aspect.
Of course, philosophical considerations on human praxis have been an
extended history with many consequences to the recent views on it. Here
we attempt to limit ourselves to study only those aspects of the problem
which are closely connected to the characterization of the specificity of our
proposed philosophy of technology.
One of the most important philosophical problems is the understanding the
in the context of human praxis.2 Reification certainly is a funda¬
mental component of the human praxis, but in our view that aspectwhich is not
crucial in the understanding the technological aspect of the praxis.The
over a situation" aspect of the praxis can be identified as a technological one.
There can be identified a kind of proliferation of conceptual tools applied in
the description of praxis (or practice) in different philosophical traditions, so,
speaking about human labor, social production, agency of actors, etc. we can
refer similar conceptual structures in different contexts. The sophisticated
translation of the terms and meanings to each other could be a topic of an¬
other study. Here we simply declare the aspiration that the proposed techno-
2 An excellent discussion of these problems can be found in the book [2], especially in
the papers [222, 103, 112, 106, 52],
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logical interpretation of the praxis practically includes and refers to the com¬
mon content of the different descriptions.
Every human practice yields to an - imperfect - realization of human con¬
trol over a situation; i.e. the situation is not governed to an end by natural
constraints but by specific human aims. Every human situation can be con¬
sidered to be a technological one. Every human being is a technological agent.
Every human aim is attainable by a specific technology. Every human tool can
be considered to be a situation-bound technological tool.
The technological aspect of human practice embodies human defense¬
lessness and human commitment to the successful control over the situa¬
tions of human life.Without such obviously partial success, we would not
survive as human beings but return to natural situations as natural- animal
- beings. Every technology is a technology of humanity, and human beings,
the human world, and human cultures and societies are equally products of
technologies. Technology is the only tool for human self-creation. The
branches of technologies can be associated with families of life situations.
Different economic, legal, psychical, social, cultural, material, and mechan¬
ical technologies serve humans’ self-creating praxis. In that sense, different
kinds of engineering can be considered to be a meta-technological activity
at different situations: a specific practice of handling the components of the
given technological situationswith the aim of cultivating controllable situa¬
tions in the human environment.
Notice that in this philosophy of technology the concept of situation has a
central role.A situation is a (finite or infinite) collection or set of beingswhich
includes, as an element, at least a human being. Every situation is a human
situation. The concept of situation is closely related to the concept of world
and the concept of system. Every world includes at least a human being, so
the worlds are human worlds, similarly as itwas declared in the case of situa¬
tions, but the world is an organized totality around the humans, in contrast to
the situation of which has no such a structure. From a structural point of view,
the situation is similar to the systems. A system is a set of beings taking arbi¬
trarily together without any given structure. However the situation is given,
the system is freely chosen. So, the situation can be considered as a world
without structure or a systemwithout constitutive freedom.
Let’s repeat the characterization of the technological situation. Technologi¬
cal situations are situations with a specific character. More concretely, tech¬
nological situations vary and they are not homogeneous in nature, so, they
can be identified on the basis of their constituents. The components that
make up a technological situation are:
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a given set of (natural or artificial) beings,
® humans (human agencies),
their aims, and
(situation-bound) tools.
Based on the above comparative notes we can speak about technological
systems, but it is impossible to aspire to the control over the world. In prac¬
tice, the humanworld is disjointed into controllable situations.
For the connection of these ideas to Heidegger famous analyzes in his paper
Question Concerning Technology", we can consistently substitute
Heidegger’s concept of (Enframing) for the concept of
situation” used above. In this case, perhaps we will also notice that our stand¬
point in the characterization of the historical forms of technology is significantly
different from Heidegger’s. According to Heidegger, there is a sharp difference
between Ancient and modern technology (the earlier is creative, the latter is
related to power). However, we believe that this differentiation is unjustified:
creation and power can only characterize any kind of technology together [83].
So, in this view of technology, the fundamental question of philosophy of
technology can be answered considering the technology-society complex in
the context of human praxis. Technology and society coexisting and their
complex is value-laden. This view of technology can be considered as a ver¬
sion of critical philosophy of technology.
3.4 Perspectives on the science-technology relationships
The inseparability of technological and human spheres, that is, the human
values built into technological tools as well as imagining technological tools
which influence human aims, have become more or less completely accepted
in the endeavors of the philosophy of technology. Thus, in fact, we can say
that the popular- views of the philosophy of technology nowadays are either
substantivist or critical philosophies of technology or a certain mixture of
these. Nevertheless, they might diverge in several details. For example, if we
compare the views of contemporary philosophers of technology such as Pick¬
ering, Haraway, Latour or Ihde [92], it becomes clear that the analysis of the
problematic relationship between the human and the non-human is centrally
important for all of them (though they use different concepts). Thus, for ex¬
ample, they characteristically make a stand in connection with the possibly
symmetric nature of the relationship between the human and the non-
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human, the nature of the activity of technological tools, the possibility of the
incarnation of human intentions in non-human entities and the incarnation
of non-human strivings in humans and in similar connected questions.
Notice, that the dominance of the philosophical ideas of hermeneutics, so¬
cial constructivism and the postmodern point of view in the philosophy of
technology is basically connected to the nature of technology. As was already
discussed, technology can always be interpreted in a certain situation, that is,
it is a situation-dependent entity. Entities and forms of existence of this kind
are difficult to interpret for philosophical systems such as positivism or the
whole tradition of analytic philosophy since these points of view precisely
concentrate on researching and describing entities and knowledge which are
situation-independent. However, hermeneutics, the postmodern approach,
and social constructivism precisely deal with the interpretation of entities and
forms of existence embedded in a situation (world, life-world, social envi¬
ronment), that is, as a result of their basic philosophical assumptions, they are
more appropriate for describing and interpreting situation-dependent tech¬
nology. Consequently, we can also say that hermeneutics, social constructiv¬
ism, and postmodern philosophical systems are systems of the philosophy of
technology as well since they necessarily include the possibility of interpret¬
ing technology philosophically, though of course only in an implicit form, or
using aHegelian term, in an unhappy form.
We can utilize the mentioned philosophical points of view not only for in¬
terpreting technology but also in the interpretation and description of the
sciences. In fact, it is our experience that hermeneutical, social constructivist,
feminist, etc. points of view have also developed in the philosophy of science.
In these philosophies of science, they try to understand science (either the
whole of science or some of its problems) by placing it into some kind of
(human or social) situation.The consequence of this is that the methodology
of interpreting technology and science is necessarily identical in the men¬
tioned approaches. As a result of the identical points of view, the differences
between technology and sciencemight be blurred ormight seem insignificant
since we understand all of them chiefly as a certain being-in-the-world, as
something which fits into a context. In recent years, the outlines of an inde¬
pendent entity called technoscience have been developing from the common
characteristics of technology and science which we identified with the situa¬
tion-dependent point of view described above. The interpretation of techno¬
science is more and more popular worldwide, and it is gradually taking over
the roles of philosophy of technology and philosophy of science
whichwere earlier regarded as separate [154], [92].
Given the above conceptualization of technology, it is evident that technol¬
ogy has primacy over intellectual practices such as doing philosophy or doing
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science.This is because being a human is prerequisite for being a philosopher
or for being a scientist. Evidently, there is no philosophy or science without
specific, historically determined technological practices. In other words: phi¬
losophy and science (as well as any other field of human culture) necessarily
rely on and thus include technological components [185], The fundamental
interrelations of science, philosophy and technology can be summarized in a
schematic formula: = technology + philosophy" [182],
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concept which is seldom present in real life situations for epistemic agents.
Therefore, calculating with certain evidence appeal's to be hardly applicable
which limits the applicability of classic conditionalization. Replacing classic
conditionalization with Jeffrey conditionalization allows the system to work
with uncertain evidence in accordance with Kolmogorov’s axioms. While
there are further interesting questions concerning Bayesian probability, such
as how to determine prior probability, or how to evaluate the values provided
by functions that are based on Bayesian probability theory, these questions
are independent from the questions of the certainty of evidence. The above
paper only aimed to show that the interpretation of Bayesian probability
theory currently applied in a great number of decision support systems is
seriously limited. The offered alternative, using Jeffrey conditionalization
significantly extends the applicability of the reasoning structure of decision
support systems if Bayesian probability theories are at all applicable. For
example, for cases where the evidence used by such systems is not entirely
certain, the level of certainty attributed to the used evidence can be accom¬
modated to the probability calculations used by the reasoning structure of the
system.Without Jeffrey conditionalization this information is lost during such
calculations, which causes the system to estimate the probability of an event
to be higher or lower than it really is (i.e. it should be estimated according to
our present knowledge concerning probability). Since the applicability of
Bayesian probability theory is the subject of intense debates, this paper can¬
not aim for the general assessment of the framework but only for the im¬
provement of its application in decision support systems.
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